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A Distinction with a Difference: Rights,
Privileges, and the Fourteenth Amendment
William J. Aceves†

Abstract
In Timbs v. Indiana, the Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on excessive fines was incorporated and applied to states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the decision was
unanimous, the concurring opinions offered a revealing reflection of past
constitutional battles and an intriguing vision of future conflicts. Both Justices
Gorsuch and Thomas suggested resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as a more appropriate vehicle than the Due Process Clause for applying
the prohibition on excessive fines to states.
Justice Thomas took this proposal one step further. He suggested the
Privileges or Immunities Clause should be used instead of the Due Process
Clause to address all fundamental rights. This would not be a simple exchange
of constitutional sources to guide incorporation; the actual scope of fundamental
rights would also be affected. Unlike the Due Process Clause, Justice Thomas
found the Privileges or Immunities Clause to be more grounded in history and
tradition, thereby offering the Court a guiding principle for distinguishing
“fundamental rights that warrant protection from nonfundamental rights that do
not.” The Privileges or Immunities Clause would allow for the application of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines to states. But under this

† William J. Aceves is the Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law at California Western School
of Law. I am grateful to Erwin Chemerinsky and Jessica Fink for their thoughtful comments. Andrea
Alberico, Regina Calvario, Sara Emerson, Lillian Glenister, Warsame Hassan, and Ash Kargaran
provided excellent research assistance. All errors are my own.
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approach, other rights, such as abortion or same-sex marriage, would not be
considered privileges of “American citizenship” entitled to constitutional
protection.
The consequences of resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause at
the expense of the Due Process Clause are troubling and far-reaching.
Renouncing over a century of precedent would result in the radical
transformation of constitutional law and the weakening of fundamental rights.
In the realm of the Fourteenth Amendment, rights and privileges are a distinction
with a difference.

I.

Introduction
In Timbs v. Indiana,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines was incorporated and applied to
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
According to a unanimous Court, this safeguard is “‘fundamental to our
scheme of ordered liberty,’ with ‘dee[p] root[s] in [our] history and
tradition.’”3 Timbs is historically significant because the Court addressed one
of the last remaining provisions of the Bill of Rights to be incorporated and
applied to state and local governments. Until this decision, four provisions in
the Bill of Rights had not yet been incorporated through the Due Process
Clause and, therefore, were not conclusively applicable to states: (1) the
Third Amendment’s prohibition on quartering of troops in homes; (2) the
Fifth Amendment’s right to a grand jury indictment in criminal cases; (3) the
Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial in civil cases; and (4) the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines. 4 To most scholars and jurists,
this represented a constitutional anomaly. As Justice Gorsuch wryly noted
during oral argument in Timbs, “And here we are in 2018 . . . still litigating
incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Really?” 5
While the Court’s decision was unanimous, the concurring opinions
offered a revealing reflection of past constitutional battles and an intriguing
vision of future conflicts. Both Justices Gorsuch and Thomas suggested
resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a more appropriate vehicle than the Due Process Clause for
applying the prohibition on excessive fines to states. 6
1. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
2. Id. at 687.
3. Id. at 686–87 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)).
4. ERWIN C HEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL L AW 565 (5th ed. 2017).
5. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091)
[hereinafter Timbs Transcript]. Justice Kavanaugh offered a similar perspective during oral
argument, asking whether it is “just too late in the day to argue that any of the Bill of Rights is not
incorporated?” Id. at 33.
6. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 691 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
While the Privileges or Immunities Clause is rarely considered by the Supreme Court, it has still
received significant scholarly attention. See, e.g., KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
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Justice Thomas took this proposal one step further.7 He suggested the
Privileges or Immunities Clause should be used instead of the Due Process
Clause to address the existence of fundamental rights. 8 This would not be a
simple exchange of constitutional sources to guide incorporation; the actual
scope of fundamental rights would also be affected. Unlike the Due Process
Clause, Justice Thomas found the Privileges or Immunities Clause to be more
grounded in history and tradition, thereby offering the Court a guiding
principle for distinguishing “‘fundamental’ rights that warrant protection
from nonfundamental rights that do not.”9 The Privileges or Immunities
Clause would, therefore, allow for the application of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines to states. But under this
approach, other rights, such as abortion or same-sex marriage, would not be
considered privileges of “American citizenship” entitled to constitutional
protection.
This Article examines the Court’s decision in Timbs and its broader
implications for the protection of fundamental rights. While Timbs involves
incorporation of the Bill of Rights and the prohibition on excessive fines, the
case also highlights the ongoing debate regarding substantive due process,
fundamental rights, and even reproductive autonomy. Part II of this Article
reviews the Court’s unanimous opinion in Timbs, and Part III examines the
concurring opinions and their call for resurrecting the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Part IV then assesses the implications of this call and the
shortcomings of this approach. The consequences of resurrecting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause at the expense of the Due Process Clause are
both troubling and far-reaching. Renouncing over a century of precedent
would result in the radical transformation of constitutional law and the
weakening of fundamental rights. And, it would represent the effective death
of stare decisis as a guiding principle for the Court.

AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF

AMERICAN C ITIZENSHIP (2014); Richard L. Aynes, Ink
Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295 (2009);
Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334 (2005); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 43 (1989).
To be clear, the Privileges or Immunities Clause is distinct from the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which prohibits states from discriminating
against non-state citizens. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, with U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
7. During the 2018–2019 term, Justice Thomas increased his criticism of well-established
precedent. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Precedent, Meet Clarence Thomas. You May Not Get Along.,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/politics/clarence-thomassupreme-court-precedent.html [https://perma.cc/X2RA-7W5Q].
8. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 691 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Throughout his tenure on the
Court, Justice Thomas has expressed growing interest in the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 805 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 692 (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment)).
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II.

Timbs v. Indiana and the Due Process Clause
Civil forfeiture has long been a controversial issue in the United States.10
Under civil forfeiture laws, government actors can seize a person’s property
that has allegedly been used in the commission of a crime. Such seizure can
occur without even proving the person was guilty of the underlying crime.
While civil forfeiture laws vary by state, many jurisdictions only require
probable cause to seize assets they believe were used as part of criminal
activity.11 If successful, government actors can then keep the property,
whether it is real estate, cash, guns, or cars. Because of its financial benefits,
state and local governments have been aggressive in their civil forfeiture
practices. It has become a multimillion-dollar industry.12
In May 2013, Tyson Timbs was arrested by Indiana state police and
charged with dealing in a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit
theft.13 He subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced to one year of home
detention and five years of probation.14 As part of his sentence, he was
assessed $1,203 in court-related fees and costs.15 While his criminal case was
pending, state officials instituted civil forfeiture proceedings seeking title to
Timbs’s 2009 Land Rover SUV, which he had been driving when he was
arrested.16 According to the civil complaint, the vehicle had been used to
facilitate the violation of a criminal statute and was subject to seizure under
Indiana law.17
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the state’s
request.18 It noted the Land Rover was worth more than four times the
maximum $10,000 monetary fine that could be assessed against Timbs for
his drug conviction. 19 Accordingly, the vehicle’s forfeiture would have been
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of Timbs’s offense and, therefore,
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 20
The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.21 While it

10. See generally STEFAN D. CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE L AW IN THE UNITED S TATES (2d
ed. 2013).
11. Id. § 3-3, at 104–05.
12. See generally DICK M. CARPENTER II, ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT:
THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE (2d ed. 2015); Note, How Crime Pays: The
Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture as a Tool of Criminal Law Enforcement, 131
HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2018).
13. State v. Timbs, 62 N.E.3d 472, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Indiana law sets the maximum possible fine for felony violations at $10,000. IND. CODE
§ 35-50-2-4 to -7 (2019).
20. Timbs, 62 N.E.3d at 477.
21. Id.
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acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court had yet to apply the Excessive Fines
Clause to states, it concluded that the Clause did, in fact, apply. 22 The Indiana
Supreme Court granted review and reversed. 23 Citing principles of federalism
and the lack of controlling U.S. Supreme Court guidance, it held the
Excessive Fines Clause constrains only federal action and is inapplicable to
state action.24
Arguing that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines
applied to states, Timbs petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review. 25
Timbs focused his argument on the applicability of the Due Process Clause
as the proper mechanism for incorporating the Eighth Amendment. Timbs
added a second argument—that the Excessive Fines Clause also applied to
states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.26 The State of Indiana rejected both arguments and urged the
Court to not consider whether incorporation should occur through the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 27 Significantly, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause was not even at issue in the Indiana Supreme Court’s earlier
decision.28
A diverse coalition of conservative and liberal groups filed amicus briefs
with the Supreme Court supporting Timbs. Their common interest stemmed
from concerns with government overreach, including the seizure of private
property through civil forfeiture programs. The ACLU, NAACP, and ABA
as well as the Pacific Legal Foundation and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
all filed amicus briefs in support of the proposition that the Excessive Fines
Clause applied to state and local governments. 29 Of the seventeen amicus
briefs filed on Timbs’s behalf, most argued that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause.
However, three amicus briefs argued in support of using the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as the more appropriate mechanism for incorporation. 30

22. Id. at 475 n.4.
23. State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1185 (Ind. 2017).
24. Id. at 1181, 1184.
25. Brief for Petitioners at 37, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091).
26. Id.
27. Brief for Respondent at 13, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091).
28. The Indiana Supreme Court briefly referenced the Privileges or Immunities Clause in its
review of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on incorporation. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d at 1183.
29. See, e.g., Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, the R Street Institute, the Fines and
Fees Justice Center, and the Southern Poverty Law Center as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal
Foundation in Support of Petitioners, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091).
30. Brief for the American Civil Rights Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2,
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091); Brief of Amicus Curiae Cause of Action
Institute in Support of Petitioners at 2, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091); Brief
of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, Inc. and Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Petitioners,
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091).
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In Timbs v. Indiana,31 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the Indiana Supreme Court.32 The question presented to the Court
asked whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is “an
‘incorporated’ protection applicable to the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”33
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the
Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government at its adoption, a
principle first set forth in Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore.34
This changed with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.
Since then, the Court engaged in the selective incorporation of the Bill of
Rights to the states on a case-by-case basis. Eventually, most of its provisions
were incorporated. 35 The Court made these determinations by reviewing the
historical significance of the underlying right under consideration. According
to Justice Ginsburg, “[a] Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, we have
explained, if it is ‘fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,’ or ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”36
Having identified the Court’s methodology for incorporation, Justice
Ginsburg then proceeded to review the historical significance of the
protection from excessive fines. She traced its lineage to the Magna Carta,
the English Bill of Rights, and throughout English history.37 This protection
also found traction in the American colonies as evidenced by the Virginia
Declaration of Rights and, eventually, the Eighth Amendment. 38 Justice
Ginsburg indicated that when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in
1868, most states already granted protection from excessive fines. 39 And
today, “acknowledgment of the right’s fundamental nature remains
widespread.” 40
In addition to the historical record, the Court also considered the Eighth
Amendment’s practical significance. According to Justice Ginsburg, the
protection against excessive fines was necessary to protect against
government overreach that could undermine other constitutional liberties. 41
For example, excessive fines could be used “to retaliate against or chill the
speech of political enemies.”42 They could also be used as a source of revenue
31. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
32. Id. at 686–87.
33. Id. at 686.
34. Id. at 687 (citing Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247
(1833)).
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)).
37. Id. at 687–88.
38. Id. at 688.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 689.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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in criminal proceedings, wholly unrelated to “the penal goals of retribution
and deterrence.”43 In sum, both the historical record and practical concerns
were overwhelmingly in support of incorporation.
For these reasons, the Court held that the prohibition embodied in the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment was incorporated through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 44 And, once a Bill of
Rights protection is incorporated, Justice Ginsburg indicated “there is no
daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.” 45
Therefore, the Eighth Amendment applied with equal force to the states. 46
The case was then remanded to the Indiana state courts for further
proceedings.47
III. Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause
Both Justices Gorsuch and Thomas issued concurring opinions in
Timbs. In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch agreed that the historical evidence
supported the incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 48 Citing to Justice Thomas’s prior concurrence in
McDonald v. City of Chicago and the work of several legal scholars, Justice
Gorsuch suggested the Privileges or Immunities Clause may be the more
appropriate vehicle for incorporation than the Due Process Clause. 49
Notwithstanding, he noted this distinction would not change the outcome of
the Court’s decision.50
In contrast, Justice Thomas only concurred in the Court’s judgment.51
He acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment “makes the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines fully applicable to the States.” 52
He disagreed, however, on using the Due Process Clause to achieve this
outcome:

43. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991)).
44. Id. at 687.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 691. The Court also rejected the claim that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to
civil in rem forfeiture. According to Justice Ginsburg, “[i]n considering whether the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates a protection contained in the Bill of Rights, we ask whether the right
guaranteed—not each and every particular application of that right—is fundamental or deeply
rooted.” Id. at 690.
48. Id. at 691 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
49. Id. (citing Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO S T. L.J. 1509 (2007); AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF R IGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163–214 (1998); MICHAEL
KENT C URTIS, NO S TATE S HALL ABRIDGE: T HE F OURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1986)).
50. Id.
51. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
52. Id.
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Instead of reading the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
to encompass a substantive right that has nothing to do with ‘process,’
I would hold that the right to be free from excessive fines is one of the
‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States’ protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.53
Justice Thomas previously argued in support of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, and against the Due Process Clause, in McDonald v. City
of Chicago, a case that involved the incorporation of the Second Amendment
and its application to state and local governments. In McDonald, Justice
Thomas indicated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause appeared to grant
U.S. citizens “a certain collection of rights.”54 But, he argued the scope of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause had been eviscerated by the Court in the 19th
century in the aptly titled Slaughter-House Cases.55 As a result, the Court had
used the Due Process Clause as the mechanism for protecting fundamental
rights from state encroachment. 56 To Justice Thomas, such an approach was
both “curious” and a “legal fiction”—“[t]he notion that a constitutional
provision that guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life,
liberty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity
for even the most casual user of words.” 57
In Timbs, Justice Thomas reiterated these criticisms of the Due Process
Clause and called on the Court to use the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
address fundamental rights. 58 He found the Court’s jurisprudence on
substantive due process to be “oxymoronic” because it sought to address
fundamental rights through a constitutional provision that was meant to
address procedural rights. 59 Because of the disconnect between the Due
Process Clause and fundamental rights, Justice Thomas argued the Court was
continually struggling to identify the scope of these substantive due process
rights. He then identified two cases, Obergefell v. Hodges and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, where he asserted the Court’s efforts to define “the
universe of ‘fundamental rights’” bordered “on meaningless.”60 As a result,
Justice Thomas indicated the Court had failed to adhere to any “guiding
principle to distinguish ‘fundamental’ rights that warrant protection from

53. Id. Justice Thomas’s interest in the Privileges or Immunities Clause precedes his tenure on
the Court. See Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63 (1989).
54. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 808 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
55. Id. (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)).
56. Id. at 809.
57. Id. at 809, 811.
58. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 691–92 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
59. Id. at 692.
60. Id. (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
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nonfundamental rights that do not.” 61
Because the Court’s substantive due process precedents had allowed the
Court to fashion fundamental rights without any textual constraints, Justice
Thomas stated it was “unsurprising that among these precedents are some of
the Court’s most notoriously incorrect decisions.” 62 He then cited Dred Scott
v. Sandford and Roe v. Wade as two examples.63
Having established the failings of the Due Process Clause, Justice
Thomas proceeded to resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the
mechanism for applying the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive
fines to the states. Through an originalist lens, he noted the words
“privileges” and “immunities” were synonymous with rights to the drafters
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 64 And, these rights were protected from state
infringement through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.65 Justice Thomas then conducted an extensive review of the
historical record, from English common law through the American colonial
experience and then from early state practice through the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 66 He concluded that this historical record confirmed
the prohibition on excessive fines was an essential right and one entitled to
protection from state encroachment: “[a]s a constitutionally enumerated right
understood to be a privilege of American citizenship, the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines applies in full to the States.”67
IV. Rights and Privileges under the Fourteenth Amendment: A Distinction
with a Difference
In Timbs v. Indiana, the question presented to the Court was relatively
simple and uncontroversial: “[i]s the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause an ‘incorporated’ protection applicable to the States under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?”68 Given the overwhelming
historical record in support of incorporation, it is not surprising that the
Court’s opinion was affirmative and unanimous.
While Justices Gorsuch and Thomas both agreed with the Court’s
judgment, their reasoning differed. Justice Gorsuch raised, but did not
resolve, whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause might serve as “the
appropriate vehicle for incorporation” rather than the Due Process Clause.69

61. Id. (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811).
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857)).
64. Id. at 692.
65. Id. at 691.
66. Id. at 693–98.
67. Id. at 698.
68. Id. at 686 (majority opinion).
69. Id. at 691 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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Beyond referencing Justice Thomas’s prior reasoning in McDonald, Justice
Gorsuch did not expand on his own reasoning.
Justice Thomas also expressed a preference for using the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in this case. His reasoning, however, extended well
beyond the question of incorporation and delved into substantive due process
and fundamental rights. 70 According to Justice Thomas, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause should not only be used to apply the protections of the
Bill of Rights to states. He argued it should also be used to define the nature
of these rights. Such an approach would resurrect the Privileges or
Immunities Clause from its irrelevance. To Justice Thomas, this would be
consistent with the historical understanding of the words “privileges or
immunities.” 71 And, it would allow the Court to end its problematic reliance
on the Due Process Clause to address fundamental rights. 72
But not all rights would be recognized as “privileges or immunities”
subject to constitutional protection. This is the real significance of Justice
Thomas’s methodology. Unlike the Due Process Clause, Justice Thomas
believed the Privileges or Immunities Clause would provide the Court with
textual constraints to guide its jurisprudence on fundamental rights. 73 This
would provide a “guiding principle to distinguish ‘fundamental’ rights that
warrant protection from nonfundamental rights that do not.”74 Significantly,
this methodology would apply to both enumerated and unenumerated rights.
In Timbs, for example, a review of English and American history
revealed the prohibition on excessive fines “has been consistently recognized
as a core right worthy of constitutional protection.”75 As such, Justice
Thomas believed it was a “privilege of American citizenship” entitled to
protection under the Eighth Amendment. 76
While other fundamental rights were not at issue in Timbs, Justice
Thomas offered some ideas on which rights would not be considered a
privilege of American citizenship. He cited both Obergefell v. Hodges and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey as cases that reflected the Court’s inability to
develop or apply a guiding principle for defining fundamental rights. 77 His
analysis suggests the rights at issue in those cases—same-sex marriage and
abortion—would not be considered privileges of American citizenship
70. Id. at 691–92 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
71. Id.
72. But see Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory
of the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599 (2019) (arguing that an originalist
approach to the Due Process Clause can support substantive due process).
73. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 691–92 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
74. Id. (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
75. Id. at 698.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 692 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).

2019]

Article

11

entitled to constitutional protection. 78 Justice Thomas also referred to both
Dred Scott v. Sandford and Roe v. Wade as examples “of the Court’s most
notoriously incorrect decisions” in the realm of substantive due process. 79
As a rhetorical argument, Justice Thomas’s conflation of Dred Scott—
a case universally recognized as the worst constitutional decision in history—
and Roe is to be expected. It is a connection that is routinely made by critics
of substantive due process. 80 Other justices have made similar connections
between Dred Scott and reproductive autonomy cases, including Planned
Parenthood.81 References to Dred Scott also appear in marriage equality
cases.82 And yet, these rhetorical connections are challenged as often as they
are raised.83
As a legal argument, these connections are also subject to criticism.
Many jurists and scholars argue that Dred Scott was the foundation for
substantive due process. 84 There is certainly some debate on this point. 85 But
the flaw in Dred Scott was not that substantive due process was arguably used
to address fundamental rights. Instead, the Court’s flaw was using substantive
due process to protect the alleged property rights of slave owners and failing
to recognize the liberty rights of African Americans. By comparison, Roe
acknowledged that reproductive autonomy was an essential right entitled to
protection from government encroachment. 86 In other words, Roe was correct
because it did precisely what the Court in Dred Scott failed to do: accord
primacy to personal autonomy over the coercive power of government. 87
The Due Process Clause has long been used to protect a litany of privacy
rights as fundamental rights. As Justice Thomas points out, same-sex

78. See, e.g., Tim A. Lemper, The Promise and Perils of ‘Privileges or Immunities’: Saenz v.
Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 319 (1999).
79. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 692 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
80. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 995, 1011 (2003); Debora Threedy, Slavery Rhetoric and the Abortion Debate, 2
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 3, 7 (1994).
81. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 1001–02 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
83. See, e.g., Amy Davidson Sorkin, What Does Marriage Equality Have to Do with Dred Scott,
THE NEW YORKER (July 8, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/what-doesmarriage-equality-have-to-do-with-dred-scott [https://perma.cc/RVM4-47GN].
84. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: T HE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE L AW 32 (1990).
85. See generally Justin Buckley Dyer, The Substance of Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade, 16 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 421 (2018); Timothy Sandefur, Dred Scott and Other Fallacies of Substantive
Due Process, CATO UNBOUND (Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/02/21/timo
thy-sandefur/dred-scott-other-fallacies-substantive-due-process [https://perma.cc/J4ZB-WQ8A].
86. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. In fact, some scholars argue this desire to distance constitutional interpretation from Dred
Scott can also explain the Court’s reasoning in marriage equality cases. See, e.g., Jack Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, 13 Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49, 60 (2007).

12

Texas Law Review Online

[Vol. 98:1

marriage and abortion are two such rights; but, many more exist. These
include the right to procreate, the right to custody of one’s children, the right
to keep one’s family together, and the right to make medical care decisions. 88
Other rights are also protected under the Due Process Clause, including the
right of access to courts. 89 Even the Court’s jurisprudence on personal
jurisdiction has been guided by the Due Process Clause. 90 These are
engrained principles of constitutional jurisprudence that could be lost if the
Court pivots from the Due Process Clause to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
Despite his entreaties, Justice Thomas does not offer a convincing
explanation for why the Privileges or Immunities Clause would provide any
more of a guiding principle for elucidating fundamental rights than the Due
Process Clause.91 In fact, there is none, although Justice Thomas would argue
otherwise.92 But even if the words “privileges” and “immunities” were
synonymous with “rights” to the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, they
still offer no meaningful way for determining which “privileges or
immunities” are rights subject to protection. Courts would still be required to
conduct a review of the historical record, as Justice Ginsburg did through the
Due Process Clause in Timbs.
Some scholars have offered a guiding principle for applying the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, but it is one that eviscerates the fundamental
rights subject to constitutional protection. This narrow principle would apply
the protections of the Privileges or Immunities Clause only to enumerated
rights—those rights appearing in the first eight amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. 93 Unenumerated rights would not be considered “privileges or
immunities.” However, this approach is subject to its own criticisms, as the
historical record offers a broader understanding behind the original meaning
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 94
Applying the Privileges or Immunities Clause in lieu of the Due Process
88. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
89. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
90. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
91. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 859–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 854–55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The mere fact that the Clause does not expressly
list the rights it protects does not render it incapable of principled judicial application. The
Constitution contains many provisions that require an examination of more than just constitutional
text to determine whether a particular act is within Congress’ power or is otherwise
prohibited . . . .”).
93. See, e.g., LASH, supra note 6, at xi; cf. Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora’s
Box Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, the Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 59–62 (2010).
94. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: T HE P RESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 60–61, 194 (1st ed. 2004); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF R IGHTS 49 (1986); Aynes, supra note 6, at 1302–03.

2019]

Article

13

Clause to address fundamental rights would raise other issues. By its terms,
the Clause only addresses “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States,” a point Justice Ginsburg recognized during oral argument in
Timbs.95 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas repeatedly referred to the
rights of “English subjects,” “Englishmen,” “free m[e]n,” and “citizens.” 96
This raises the question of whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause
would differentiate between the fundamental rights of U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals in the United States. 97 Such a distinction finds little support
in the Court’s existing jurisprudence on fundamental rights.98 It is, of course,
also deeply troubling and may conflict with other constitutional provisions,
including the Equal Protection Clause. 99 But to those seeking to limit the
constitutional rights of foreign nationals, Justice Thomas offers a
methodology to achieve their goal. 100
Finally, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, by its terms, only applies to states. 101 Applying Justice
Thomas’s methodology to assess fundamental rights would thus leave the
Court with a stark choice: accept that the protection of fundamental rights
differs based on the identity of the government actor restricting those rights,
or apply the same methodology to both federal and state action because “there
is no daylight between the federal and state conduct” that the Constitution
prohibits or requires. 102 The former is logically inconsistent and contrary to
the Court’s modern approach to the Bill of Rights. The latter would result in
the profound retrenchment of fundamental rights if the Court accepts a
narrow interpretation of the rights protected under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and applies this interpretation to both the federal and state
governments.
In sum, there are compelling reasons for why the Due Process Clause is
preferable to the Privileges or Immunities Clause in addressing fundamental
rights. The Privileges or Immunities Clause does not solve “the guiding
principle” problem. In fact, it creates its own problems by having to address
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); Timbs Transcript, supra note 5, at 6. Even
Indiana raised this point in its briefing to the Court. Brief for Respondent, supra note 27, at 15.
96. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 691, 693, 695 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment).
97. Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 62 (2011).
98. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
693 (2001); but see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205, 230 (1982);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366, 382 (1971); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886).
100. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 49, at 170.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
102. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019). Or, as Justice Harlan indicated in Duncan v.
Louisiana, perhaps the provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to states “jot-for-jot and case-for-case”
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).

14

Texas Law Review Online

[Vol. 98:1

the rights of foreign nationals as well as managing the federal-state
distinction. There are also practical consequences that cannot be overstated.
Countless decisions would be affected, including right to privacy cases,
incorporation cases, and even cases addressing personal jurisdiction. 103 By
renouncing a century of precedent and dozens of decisions, the Court would
also signal the demise of stare decisis as its own guiding principle. The Court
would cause profound harm to its institutional legitimacy, and its past
decisions would be exposed to greater scrutiny and less deference.
Tellingly, the Court laid the foundation for this development in a series
of decisions issued after Timbs. In Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,104 the
Court considered whether to overrule its earlier decision in Nevada v. Hall
limiting state sovereign immunity. 105 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas
noted that “stare decisis is ‘not an inexorable command.’”106 And,
significantly, he added that stare decisis is “at its weakest when we interpret
the Constitution.”107 Justice Thomas then listed four factors the Court
considers in deciding whether to overturn precedent: “the quality of the
decision’s reasoning; its consistency with related decisions; legal
developments since the decision; and reliance on the decision.” 108 Because
the Court found its earlier decision in Hall was inconsistent with the historical
record and contrary to the Court’s more recent opinions, it overruled that
decision.109 In dissent, Justice Breyer expressed concern with the Court’s
reasoning and acknowledged the consequences of disregarding stare decisis,
including its impact on legal stability and societal expectations. 110 The
Court’s rejection of stare decisis caused Justice Breyer “to wonder which
cases the Court will overrule next.”111
Justice Breyer’s query about the future of stare decisis was raised anew
103. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (incorporation);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (privacy); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (personal jurisdiction).
104. 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019).
105. Id. at 1490. In Nevada v. Hall, the Supreme Court held that a state was not immune from
civil liability in cases brought by individuals in the courts of another state. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 414, 426–27 (1979).
106. Franchise Tax Bd., 139 S. Ct. at 1499 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233
(2009)).
107. Id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1506 (Breyer, J., dissenting). It is no coincidence that Justice Breyer cited to the
Court’s reasoning in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey—a case supporting reproductive
autonomy—to address the significance of stare decisis. Id. In Planned Parenthood, the Court
identified several factors for determining whether to overturn precedent, including whether the prior
decision “def[ies] practical workability,” when “related principles of law have so far developed as
to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine,” or when “facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application
or justification.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
111. Franchise Tax Bd., 139 S. Ct. at 1506 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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by Justice Kagan a few weeks later in another case that saw the Court again
overturn established precedent. In Knick v. Twp. of Scott,112 the Court
overturned decades of precedent and held that property owners are not
required to seek compensation under state law in state court before bringing
a federal takings claim. 113 In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan referenced
Justice Breyer’s query about the future of stare decisis and noted, “[w]ell,
that didn’t take long.” 114 She then added, “[n]ow one may wonder yet
again.” 115
V.

Conclusion
For over 160 years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process
Clause to protect a discrete set of fundamental rights and no more.116 For over
140 years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to protect an even narrower set of rights. 117 To now replace the Due
Process Clause with the Privileges or Immunities Clause would run counter
to this robust history and jurisprudential tradition. 118
For decades, the Supreme Court has rejected the distinction between
rights and privileges in constitutional analysis. 119 It would be regrettable if
the Court resurrects this distinction to limit fundamental rights through the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. That this reasoning is found in Timbs v.
Indiana—a decision that sought to curtail government overreach—is
somewhat ironic. In the realm of the Fourteenth Amendment, rights and
privileges are a distinction with a difference.
Postscript
In Fall 2019, the Supreme Court will hear argument in Ramos v.
Louisiana to address whether the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a
unanimous jury verdict applies in state courts. 120 The text of the Sixth

112. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
113. Id. at 2179.
114. Id. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. The debate over stare decisis appeared yet again in Kisor v. Wilkie, although the Court
applied the principle in that case to uphold its prior decisions. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019).
116. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 949.
117. Id. at 548.
118. But see Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, The Once and Future Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 25).
119. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 627 n.6 (1969); see also Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69, 69
(1982); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439–42 (1968); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social
Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1245–46 (1965).
120. State v. Ramos, 231 So. 3d 44 (La. Ct. App. 2017), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (U.S.
Mar. 18, 2019) (No. 18-5924).
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Amendment does not refer to jury unanimity; it is, however, a principle the
Court has long accepted. 121 While the Court has previously held this
requirement applies in the case of six person juries, it has also held that it
does not apply in cases of eleven or twelve person juries. 122 By granting
certiorari in Ramos, at least four members of the Court have expressed an
interest in again revisiting the incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
In briefing, Ramos argues the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict
is fully incorporated through the Due Process Clause. 123 He also argues the
same outcome is required by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In contrast,
Louisiana rejects the assertion that unanimity is required under either
provision.124
Constitutional revolutions seldom happen without warning. They are
often the result of a gradual process that culminates in a moment of profound
change. Given renewed interest in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it is
evident this issue will be raised anew in Ramos, thereby offering Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch another opportunity to convince their colleagues to the
ascension of privileges and the erosion of rights.

121. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366, 369 (1972).
122. Compare Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972) (perceiving “no difference
between juries required to act unanimously and those permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10
to two or 11 to one”), with Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979) (holding that when a state
has reduced the size of its juries to the minimum number permitted under the Constitution, the
verdict must be unanimous to protect constitutional principles that initially led to the six-juror
threshold). In Timbs, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the unique nature of the Court’s decision in
Apodaca, where the Court accepted a difference in the application of the Sixth Amendment to state
governments: “As we have explained, that ‘exception to th[e] general rule . . . was the result of an
unusual division among the Justices,’ and it ‘does not undermine the well-established rule that
incorporated Bill of Rights protections apply identically to the States and the Federal Government.’”
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 n.1 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 766 n.14 (2010)).
123. See Brief for Petitioners, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091).
124. See Brief for Respondent, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091).

